In his 1995 doctoral dissertation, defended in the Russian Department at the University of Helsinki, Тотальный перевод ("Total translation"), Peeter Torop develops a complex model of text, or textuality, based on a dizzying series of overlapping (metaphorical?) spatializations that bring much-needed definition to the traditionally vague notion of the translated text.
(Take 3) a respatialization of the intratextual/textual/extratextual model, looping it around into a cycle, so that extratextuality feeds intratextuality; (Take 4) a series of attempts to align Torop's model with Peircean triadicity; (Take 5) a suggestion that we imagine the front of the "strip" or "ribbon" in Takes 1-2 (the outside of the loop in Take 3) as the verbal left hemisphere, and the back/inside as the visual, affective, and kinesthetic right hemisphere; and (Take 6) a second respatialization of the model, tearing the loop anywhere and twisting it around into a Möbius strip, so that the verbal/left-brain triad feeds into the affective/right-brain triad, which in turn feeds into the verbal/left-brain triad, and so on.
Take 1: What is there
The first striking thing to note about Fig. 1 , I suggest, is that it has four columns, with two superheadings at the top -Intratextual Connections and Extratextual Connections -but there is an implicit third superheading covering the middle two columns, which in Torop's later versions of the model is Textuality (Fig. 2) . Clearly, the idea in that updated diagram is that there is considerable overlap between Intertextuality and Textuality on the left and between Extratextuality and Textuality on the right -and that overlap in the new diagram corresponds to the two middle columns in the 1995 instantiation. The four columns in 1995 have become a kind of triptych in 2017, with Intratextuality and Extratextuality set spatially a few millimeters in front of the Textuality image in the middle, but mostly overlapping the left and right columns of that middle image, and partially sharing elements with them. The second thing to note, in the transition from Fig. 1 to Fig. 2 , is that "внутритекстовые связи" in Fig. 1 , translated in Fig. 2 as "innertextuality", is also identified there as the "material" of textuality. Intratextuality is "material" presumably in the sense of constituent parts, which to my mind suggests a hierarchical subordination that may unnecessarily limit the schema's explanatory flexibility. To be sure, on the subsequent slide of Fig. 2 that column is further characterized as consisting of "subtextual meanings" and as being "discrete and/ or continual" -all of which would appear to me to be rather more nuanced than the title "material" implies. [On that subsequent slide, the "text" or "textuality" column is also characterized as consisting of "textual meanings" and as being "compositional, structural"; and the "work" or "outertextuality" column is characterized as consisting of "functional meanings" and as being "contextual, subjective (biographical)".] One of my purposes in offering six different Takes on Torop's schema is to open up broader and more flexible perspectives on each column, and on the relationships among the various columns.
The third thing to note is that the implicit domain in Torop's various instantiations of this diagram -at least in its second, third, and fourth columns -is literature. In the second column of Fig. 1 , the first cluster hierarchically formalizes poetry, the third drama; the second does the same for book publishing, but with a shift this time to nonfiction. In the third column, the first cluster is organized loosely around the Russian Formalists' literary-theoretical distinction between fabula and syuzhet, story and plot; and the third cluster, which takes its impetus from Bakhtin's theory of double-voicing, returns to fabula (though in my translation I have mapped onto Torop's "inside/outside fabula" Gerard Genette's 1980 distinction between intra-and extradiegetic narrators). The distinction between "authorial" and "anti-authorial" narrators would appear to be an allusion to Bakhtin's (1984 Bakhtin's ( [1929 ) distinction between "unidirectional" double-voicing (stylization, etc.) and "varidirectional" double-voicing (parody, etc.). The second section in that column is apparently derived from Aristotle's Poetics: "поворот", for example, which is literally a "turn, " would appear to be an allusion to Aristotle's peripeteia, or reversal. And the fourth column is obviously about the tensions between individuality and conventionality in the extratextual realms of literary method and evolution, literary schools, trends, epochs, and so on. Torop's comment:
The schema reflects only the most generic textbook approach to a holistic level analysis, in which the different levels complement each other, and one can only comprehend the text after comparing linguistic, textual, and historico-literary data. Of course, the schema is incomplete -one could have added Viktor Grigor' ev's (1979) distinction among literary language, the language of artistic literature, and poetic language; and, by the same token, Boris Uspensky's (1970) suggestion that one study the compositional levels of the presentation of points of view within the text: the plan [textual structure] of valuation, the plan of spatiotemporal perspective, the plan of psychology, the plan of phraseology. 2 (Torop 1995: 18 ; my translation, D. R.) 2 Torop (1995: 18) , "Данная схема отражает лишь самый общий, хрестоматийный подход к целостному уровневому анализу, где разные уровни дополняют друг друга и осмысление текста возможно лишь после сопоставления языковых, текстовых и историко-литературных данных. Конечно же схема не полная -можно было бы еще добавить различение В. Григорьевым (1979) Figure 1 . The textuality table from Torop (1995: 19) ; interlineal English translation by D. R. Actually, one might want to specify that "The schema reflects only the most generic textbook approach to a holistic level analysis of literature": one can imagine a generic approach to a holistic level analysis of commercials, say, or public service announcements, or prayers; or, to move away from words, of dances or orchestra performances; or, to move away from art, of religious rituals, boxing matches, or even sexual intercourse. Those are all, of course, texts; all of them should, of course, lend themselves to intratextual, textual, and extratextual analysis. And, of course, I am not telling Peeter Torop anything he does not already know: as he admits easily, "the schema is incomplete". It stands in for a much broader and more comprehensive analysis. 
Take 2: Intratextual/textual/extratextual vs. intextual/intertextual
As I noted in the introductory paragraphs, Torop's (1995) analysis in the body of the book focuses not on the intratextuality-textuality-extratextuality schema per se, but on a modified version of that schema that begins with textuality (textual translation, Chapter 2), then splits extratextuality into metatextual translation (Chapter 3), intertextual translation (Chapter 4), and extratextual translation (Chapter 5). By Chapter 5, once metatextuality and intertextuality have been split off, what is left of extratextual translation is what Roman Jakobson (1959) calls intersemiotic translation, and indeed just a single instance of intersemiotic translation, namely экранизация/ekranizatsiya or screen adaptation. Textual translation for Torop is the scope of translation normally studied by linguists and other purveyors of textual equivalence. But as Torop notes, all textual translation is also metatextual translation, by which he means the translation of the text's sociocultural environment, including such intangibles as authorial intention, point of view, and style, along with reader response and the complexities of the cultural transfer itself. Indeed, metatextual translation would appear to be the enabling condition of total translation (Torop 1995: 111) .
What, one might ask, has happened to intratextuality? Arguably, he reintroduces it in interestingly complicated form in Chapter 4, where he splits intertextuality into intertextuality proper (an interstice or between space) and intextuality, which finds presumed intertextualities within intratextuality:
In the analysis of text and its poetics, the correlation between intratextual connections and extratextual connections takes on a special methodological value. The classic definition offered by Mikhail Bakhtin and V. N. Voloshinov ("' Alien speech' is speech in speech, utterance in utterance, but at the same time it is speech about speech, utterance about utterance": Voloshinov 1995: 331) contains the possibility of distinguishing these two aspects as two possibilities or parameters of the analysis of the poetics of the alien word. It seems to us expedient to launch separate analyses of intertextuality as a semiotic(izing) space, as a possible value-generating world, and specific elements (fragments) of one text in another text, as intexts. For example, from our perspective H. A. Gaifman's definition of intertextuality as the existence of elements of one text inside another would better suit the concept of intextuality: "By intertextuality we mean all the elements in a text which relate either in an explicit or in a hidden way to another text" (Gaifman 1989: 191-192) . At the same time her parameters of intertextuality combine in-and intertextuality: 1) the technical aspect of intertextual connections, or problems of defining the presence of the elements of one text in another text; 2) the nature of intertextual connections (creation of mood, background, decrypted hidden code, etc.); 3) the degree of one text's explicitation in another; 4) the aspect in which one text is active inside another text; 5) the role played by one text inside another (Gaifman 1989: 191-195) . 3 (Torop 1995: 125-126 ; my translation, D. R.) 3 В анализе текста и его поэтики приобретает особое методологическое значение соотношение внутритекстовых и внетекстовых связей. Классическое определение М. Бахтина -В. Волошинова (""Чужая речь" -это речь в речи высказывание в высказывании но в то же время это и речь это речь о речи высказывание о высказывании": Волошинов 1995: 331) содержит возможность различения этих двух аспектов анализа поэтики чужого слова. Нам кажется целесообразным анализировать отдельно интертекстуальность как семиотическое (семиотизирующее) пространство, являющееся возможным миром порождения значений, и конкретные элементы (фрагменты) одного текста в другом In terms of Fig. 1-2 , intextuality would have to be found lurking in the lefthand column, in intratextuality, as those pieces of another text are in the text; but problematically, which is to say intriguingly, they derive from elsewhere, from a text that is out of frame. As for intertextuality, it would seem to me to be impossible to find it lurking anywhere on those Figures. It is a betweenness -as Torop (1995: 125) puts it, "a semiotic(izing) space, appearing as a possible valuegenerating world" -that would seem to require not only a separate triptych but a "space" or a "world" between the two triptychs.
One possible reading, in fact, would assimilate the extratextuality of Fig. 1 to the metatextuality of Torop (1995: Chapter 3), and the extratextuality of Chapter 5 to the intertextuality of Chapter 6. Like the extratextual connectivity of Fig. 1 , metatextuality consists of the umwelt of perspectives and attitudes on, and generally orientations to, textuality; and the only difference between the intertextuality of Chapter 4 and the extratextuality of Chapter 5 is that the former seems to consist mainly of words, while the latter bridges between words and cinema.
To complicate that suggestion further, suppose the extratextual connections of the diagram constitute not only literary method and evolution and literary schools, trends, epochs, and so on, but the metatextual intertextuality -that "semiotic(izing) space, appearing as a possible value-generating world" -that makes it possible for us to construct methods, histories, schools, trends, and the rest. Then extratextuality would become the conduit through which outtexts pass into intratextuality and become intexts. But for that conduit to function, we need Take 3.
Take 3: Looping the diagram into a cycle
Next, as the title suggests, I propose to loop Torop's triptych into a continuous cycle, as in Fig. 3 . Since more of that loop is hidden on the sides and back, we have to imagine extratextuality channeling intertextuality into textuality, so that тексте как интексты. Например, определение Х. А. Гайфман интертекстуальности как существования элементов одного текста в другом, более относится с нашей точки зрения к определению интекстовости: "By intertextuality we mean all the elements in a text which relate either in an explicit or in a hidden way to another text" (Gaifman 1989: 191-192) . В то же время ее параметры интертекстуальности объединяют ин-и интертекстуальность: 1) технический аспект интертекстуальных связей или проблемы определения наличия элемента одного текста в другом тексте; 2) природа интертекстуальной связи (создание атмосфера фона дешифруемого скрытого кода и т.д.); 3) степень эксплицитности одного текста в другом; 4) в каком аспекте один текст активен внутри другого текста; 5) какова роль одного текста в другом тексте (Gaifman 1989: 191-195) . (Torop 1995: 125-126; original emphasis) fragmentary intexts appear in intratextuality; but that still does not explain how intexts make the trek through textuality. For that, let us move on to Take 4. has complicated the Peircean legacy in salutary ways that make it difficult to identify clear traces of that legacy in his work. I propose to mobilize Peirce here very briefly, and very simply, by way of complicating the seriality of the loop imagined and pictured in Take 3. Peirce, after all, was a triadic thinker, inclined always to identify three steps -or what he called "Universes" -in any process, which he called Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness; and Torop's textuality schema just happens to be tripartite.
The impulse I have been following to serialize the three parts of his schemaintratextuality, textuality, extratextuality -arises out of the troubling sense I get, reading Chapter 1 of Torop's dissertation, that the model is basically static.
As I mentioned earlier, however, Torop mitigates that impression by proliferating complicating factors, so that any given diagram or table, no matter how apparently static, seems to swim -and turbulently surge -in complexity. Certainly the shift from the intratextual-textual-extratextual model in Chapter 1 to the metatextual-(in(ter))textual-extratextual model in the rest of the book would appear to impel an implicit flow of elements from one category to the next. This reading would to my mind justify an explicit exploration of seriality, and indeed, as we began to see in Take 3, cyclicality, so that the various elements keep flowing around the loop.
But as there is no blindingly obvious way of mapping Peircean triadic thinking onto the schema, I propose three subtakes, with escalating complexity.
Take 4a. Keep it simple at first, and read across the triptych in Take 1 from left to right, with intratextuality as First, textuality as Second, extratextuality as Third. In Peircean semeiotic, Firstness is always an abstract potentiality, Secondness a real-world clash with resisting forces, and Thirdness is an emerging rule or regularity, a larger organizing perspective that unifies the clashes introduced in Secondness. As Torop imagines extratextuality in Chapter 1, in fact, it works quite nicely as a Third: it jumps from the (intra)textual First-Second engagements to a higher level of understanding that situates those engagements in a big picture. In extratextuality-as-Third, one comes to understand this or that linguistic structure (intratextuality-as-First) and this or that literary structure (textualityas-Second) not only as driven by macrohistorical trends and schools, but as shaping and shaped by those trends and schools as well. In Peirce, after all, Thirds tend to become habitualized as "instincts" and reemerge as transformed Firsts: the seriality of First-Second-Third triads almost always loops around into the cyclicality of Second-Third-First triads, Third-First-Second triads, and so on.
The problem with Take 4a, however, is that the move from the Firstness of linguistic intratextuality to the Secondness of literary textuality seems slacklacking in the clash of forces that for Peirce is inevitably present in Secondness. Taken in series, from intratextuality-as-First to textuality-as-Second, the model seems closer to the distinctly non-Peircean building-block theory of language use (see Robinson 2016b: 137-139 for discussion), in which phonemes are combined to make morphemes, morphemes are combined to make words, words are combined to make phrases, phrases are combined to make supraphrasal units, supraphrasal units like rhythm and metre are combined to make verses, verses are combined to make stanzas, etc., or supraphrasal units like sentences are combined to make paragraphs, paraphrases are combined to make sections, sections are combined to make chapters, etc., or supraphrasal units like incidents are combined to make plots, and on and on.
It would be possible, of course, to push on textuality-as-Secondness to find in it real-world tensions and conflicts. We could, for example, imagine a storyteller having to deal with a rival story-teller who wants to hijack the story. Or we could imagine two or more people telling a story collaboratively, each at various junctures pushing more toward innovation and resisting conservation, and at other junctures pushing more toward conservation and resisting innovation.
Invoking the Russian Formalists' distinction between story (fabula) and plot (syuzhet) would then not only invoke the tensions between those two story-telling impulses -all too often presented as a stable abstract binary by the structuralistsbut would make the resulting tale a form of higher-level Thirdness emerging out of the clash of rival or collaborative story-tellers.
Take 4b. Now let us complicate matters by running Fig. 1 from right to left: extratextuality (human discursivity) as First, textuality (written and other externalized/spatialized instantiations of discourse) as Second, and intratextuality as Third. This would make "communication" an as-yet-untheorized and perhaps even as-yet-unwritten potentiality (First) that must enter into tension with "form, " with the externality of written or other expressive form (Second), leading to "linguistics" (Third) as the hierarchized formalism of phonemes, morphemes, syntagmemes, semes, pragmemes, and so on.
This Subtake might be imagined as emerging out of Mikhail Bakhtin's (1975 Bakhtin's ( [1934 Bakhtin's ( -1935 : 105) claim that "Слово живет вне себя" ("The word lives outside itself "; my translation, D. R.): if "outside itself " is understood as extratextuality, and this state is the basic situation of all discourse, then that is the Firstness of language, its communicative potential before any given text-as-Second is created. For Bakhtin the externality of all discourse is a product of its internal dialogism, or, as he calls it in his Dostoevsky book (1984[1929] ), its double-voicing: the fact that every word is saturated with the voices of the people who have used it, so that when I say something to you, the words I speak belong to neither you nor me, but are always-already outside both of us.
What that "always-already" implies, of course, is that the Firstness of extratextuality is itself the habitualized product (Third) of past discourses (Seconds), and only seems to be temporally First because we are not normally aware of its sources.
But note also that Bakhtin's theory of internal dialogism/double-voicing is also, via Julia Kristeva, the source of the theory of intertextuality 4 -which was quickly appropriated as a static structure by the structuralists, but began in Bakhtin as a dynamic clash of voices in what Torop calls "a semiotic(izing) space, appearing as a possible value-generating world". Take 4b, in other words, yields a useful mapping of Chapter 4's intertextuality onto Chapter 1's extratextuality. Where it would seem to take us from there, however, based on Torop's schema, seems less useful: first to an abstract formalism of literature, and from there to the abstract formalism of linguistics. Set up this way, of course, the Peircean triad does serve to explain how first literature, then language in general, is abstracted out of internal dialogism into transcendental structure; but do we really want to go there? In the larger context of that quotation from Bakhtin (1975 Bakhtin ( [1934 Bakhtin ( -1935 : 105), he explicitly warns us against heading in that direction:
The word lives outside itself, in its own living directedness toward the object; if we allow ourselves to be all the way distracted from this directedness, then all we will have left in our hands is the denuded corpse of the word, through which we can learn nothing, neither about a given word's social situatedness nor about its zoetic fate.
To study the word in itself, ignoring its directedness outside itself, would be as senseless as studying psychological experience outside the reality toward which it is directed and by which it is directed. 5 (My translation, D.R.)
The admonitory phrase "до конца отвлечемся" ["distracted to the end, " or, as I have translated it above, "all the way distracted" -courting awkward literality, rather than rendering it more idiomatically as "completely distracted, " in order to underscore the processuality or seriality (Aristotelian entelechy) of the image in Russian] also seems to implicate a warning against making that distraction-asintratextuality our Peircean Third, or semiotic goal. So let us try again.
Take 4c. Now shift things around a little, by making textuality our First, intra textuality and extratextuality our Seconds, and something like metatextual meaning or understanding our Third. This approach would make textualitysay, black squiggles on a page -an abstract potentiality (First) that must be run through the gauntlet of Jakobson's three types of translation (intralingual and/or interlingual and/or intersemiotic: Seconds) before it becomes possible to integrate that welter of translationality metatextually as coherent meaning.
My guess would be that Take 4c, because it seems most thoroughly grounded in the Tartu-Moscow School of Semiotics, would be most attractive to Peeter Torop. My own preference, however, would be not to pick a favourite, or to rank them in order of "correctness" or "realism" or whatever. All three Subtakes are useful Peircean perspectives on Torop's schema. By shifting from one to another we can tease a series of useful complications out of the schema that would not be possible if we locked into a single way of looking at it.
Take 5: Adding aff ective backing
Now let us ask Bakhtin: how can a word possibly be "saturated" with people's voices? He himself unpacks that image as involving multiple tonalizations; but that does not really help much, as "the word" does not really seem like the kind of storage facility that is capable of warehousing voices or tonalizations, or the kind of liquid solution that can be saturated with voices or tonalizations like dissolved sugar. Where are tonalizations stored, exactly?
Bakhtin hints a bit more clearly at an answer to that question in suggesting that tonalizations are also attitudinalizations: tonalities are not stored in "the word" so much as in people's affective orientations to "the word". We hear or use a word and feel something. We feel an attitude, or a highly nuanced aggregation of attitudes. Because as individual humans we occupy different bodies, we can never feel exactly the same attitudinalizations as other people, with the result that every new person who uses (speaks or hears) a word adds a new affective orientation to "it" -which is to say, adds that new affective orientation to that aggregation of attitudinalization(s) that we reify as "the word".
With that in mind, then, let us now imagine the front/outer panels of the looped triptych from Take 3 as the verbal left brain and the back/inner panels as the affective right brain, as in Fig. 4 . The circular metaphor for the two hemispheres of the brain is, of course, a little difficult to parse -inside/outside for left/right -but the idea is that, just as the left brain's verbal ability gives it a public prominence to which the right brain's affective, conative, and kinesthetic inclinations cannot aspire, so too is the word-based schema sketched out by Torop on the outside of the loop, visible to all, and the affect-based schema that I am suggesting as an addendum to his schema is on the inside, difficult to read. I submit, in fact, that this apparently radical modification to Torop's schema is not all that radical. Torop, after all, in exploring on the very next page the "biography" line in Fig. 1 's fourth column, lists three different authorial "worlds"the objectivized world of "литература как факт" ("literature as fact"), the subjectivized world of "литература о факте" ("literature about fact)", and the abstracted world -and lists, as his first bullet point in the subjectivized world, "эмоционльные факти (эмоционльная память)" ["emotional facts (emotional memory)"] (Torop 1995: 20) . The second bullet point is "автобиографичность" ("autobiographicality"), which for him takes three forms, factual, emotional, and mythologized/mystified. This is, obviously, still fairly minimal; one might have expected the totality of "total translation" to include more affect. Certainly the author of The Translator's Turn (Robinson 1991) does! But it is a beginning.
What then would the affective inner panels look like, fleshed out more fully? I suggest that they might look something like Fig. 5 : the same four columns, each featuring the affects that might be imagined as organizing the verbal structures listed on the "front" of Torop's evolving diagram:
First column (on left): "correctness anxiety" is my term for the affect that inwardly enforces linguistic normativity. Any deviation from structures felt (by any given individual) to be normative generates a twinge of anxiety. This affective response helps stabilize linguistic regularities, and so lends credibility to the standard assumption that they are structures, a stable linguistic architecture that can be learned and studied reliably. Not only are felt normativities felt to be hardand-fast rules; the hierarchy of linguistic subdisciplines represented in Torop's "front" column (phonology, morphology, syntax -and, not listed there, semantics and pragmatics) is also normativized affectively as a stable architecture.
Second column: The right brain does process visuals holistically, through affect, conation, and kinesthesia; it seems to me to go without saying (and it does go without saying, in Torop's book) that poetry, for example, is processed affectively, through feelings for visual form, feelings for the kinesthetics of rhythm and metre, and feelings for style. Various scholars and handbook authors have of course devised logical "rules" for verse form, paragraphing, and so on; but anyone who has been writing for a while follows not abstract rules but a "gut instinct" -which is to say, habitualized affect. How do you know when to start a new paragraph, in a scholarly paper? You feel it. If you are not sure, you try starting a new paragraph in various places, and see how each feels. Feeling is often derogated in Western thought as a random disturbance of the body that has no significance for mental processing; but as I have been trying to show in my work since Robinson (1991) 6 , affective processing is an invariably operative groundwork for cognition. Over the last two decades, too, cognitive, affective, and social neuroscientists have strongly supported that view. 7
Feelings about Intratextuality
Feelings about Extratextuality Third column: The idea here is that our cognitive grid for understanding plot and character -and especially the relationships between author and narrator and between narrator and plot/character -is largely affective in nature. Plot can 6 Robinson (1991: Ch. 1) is the beginning of my theorization of the somatics of human communication; it continues in Robinson (2003) , and becomes a dominant and defi ning research agenda in Robinson (2008 Robinson ( , 2011 Robinson ( , 2012 Robinson ( , 2013a Robinson ( , and 2013b . Beginning in Robinson (2016a) , and continuing in two books that were written later but published earlier, Robinson (2013c and 2015) , as well as Robinson (2016b Robinson ( , 2017a Robinson ( , 2017b Robinson ( , 2017c Robinson ( , and 2017d , I began to top somatic theory up with the theory of icosis, from Greek eikos ('plausible'), and Aristotle's observation in the Rhetoric that, faced with a choice between a plausible story that is untrue and a true story that is implausible, most people will choose the former, because plausibility is the product of a collective vetting that makes things feel true.
Th e idea in somatic theory is that (1) our autonomic nervous system "marks" decisionmaking processes somatically, based on past experience, with somatic responses of pain or pleasure (Damasio's somatic-marker hypothesis); (2) our mirror-neuron systems simulate other people's body states, including somatic markers, causing the aff ective priming of decisionmaking to be mirrored from person to person (somatic mimesis); and (3) somatomimetic mirroring works almost instantaneously (within 300 milliseconds, which feels instantaneous) to align the aff ective orientations of an entire group (the somatic exchange). Adding (4) icosis as the somatic plausibilization of stories and opinions off ers an explanation of how the somatics of human communication can generate, naturalize, police, and even modify normative truths, realities, structures, and empirical facts. 7 See e.g. Damasio (1994 , 1999 , 2003 , 2010 ), and LeDoux (1998 , 2002 , 2015 . be abstracted out of the realm of affect into pure form; but it begins in people wanting things, getting frustrated at not being able to get what they want, being afraid of failure, and feeling excitement and triumph when they succeed. We all have considerable experience of those feelings, from every day of our lives. We also have complex relationship-based feelings about other people, which we narrativize as part of our interactions with others, but also as part of our own inner narrativization of self: who we are in relation to others. Narrative plotting and characterization are not simply ways of imitating the experiential trajectory of those affects through specific event manifolds ("stories"), but a way of managing those affects, for purposes of morality, social success, therapy, and so on. We all tell these stories, nearly constantly. They are staples of friendship in particular, but more generally of all social life.
Fourth column: As my parenthetical insertions in that column suggest, all talk of tradition tends to invoke conflicting affects of respect for, and resistance to, authority; and all talk of regional, national, and "world" literatures tends to invoke affects related to belonging. To what groups do I/we want to belong, and how do I/we want to manage that belonging? With simple heartfelt acceptance and gratitude? Or do we want to push on our sense of belonging a little, "belong" differently, so that we risk being cast out of this or that group, but also take the chance that things might change slightly in the direction of our own likes and dislikes?
If past experience is any indication, some of my readers are by now feeling a bit nervous, and even perhaps quite indignant, about Take 5. "Are you saying that textuality is all feeling? That it has nothing to do with verbal form?" This is the problem: we work so hard to suppress all awareness of affect that, when we are faced with any serious discussion of it, the overwhelming power of affect to affect us surges in, floods us, and so makes us worry about our ability to rise above it, to restore calm, cognitive order. Hence the fear that any talk of affect at all means I am trying to supplant the verbal/cognitive "front" side of Torop's diagram -replace form and structure entirely with affect.
But remember not only that this is Take 5, near the end of the article, and I am just now mentioning affect -verbal cognition is not exactly getting overwhelmed by affect in the piece as a whole -but that here in Take 5 we have writing on both sides of the loop: verbal/cognitive semioticity on the outside, affective/conative semioticity on the inside. The idea is that each affective column on the inside is in play with its cognitive column on the outside. The shaping forces imagined on each side of the loop should be understood as leaching through the paper and interacting with its counterparts on the other side.
Take 6: Möbius semioticity
Now tear the loop anywhere and twist it around into a Möbius strip, as in Figure  6 . Now what happens?
Obviously "möbilizing" the loop has the disturbing effect of giving affect more direct access to the cognitive/semiotic form on the outside. Instead of being "trapped" on the inside of the loop, at work but neither very visible nor very puissant, now it is constantly dumping its feelings into the outside, which is constantly dumping its forms into the inside, and so on. Now affect does not just leach through the paper to its "verbal/cognitive" counterpart on the outside: respectful/resistant feelings about tradition and belonging empty out into intratextual connections, and carefully demarcated "units of method and evolution" empty out into correctness anxiety. Now everything truly does cycle through everything else. Now, as Juri Lotman (2009 Lotman ( [2004 ) predicted in Culture and Explosion, semiosis is truly a dissipative system in which anything can happen. Figure 6 . Möbius semioticity.
